It takes time for theoretical advances to get used in practical schemes. Anonymous credential schemes are no exception. For instance, existing schemes suited for real-world use lack formal, composable definitions, partly because they do not support straight-line extraction and rely on random oracles for their security arguments.
Introduction
Digital signature schemes are a fundamental cryptographic primitive. Besides their use for signing digital items, they are used as building blocks in more complex cryptographic schemes, such as blind signatures [46, 6] , group signatures [15, 56] , direct anonymous attestation [21] , electronic cash [44] , voting schemes [52] , adaptive oblivious transfer [33, 25] , and anonymous credentials [12] .
The efficient construction of such protocols, however, demands special properties of a signature scheme, in particular when the protocol needs to achieve strong privacy properties. The most important such properties seem to be that the issuance of a signature and its later use in a protocol is unlinkable as well as that the scheme is able to sign multiple messages (without employing a hash function). The first signature scheme that met these requirements is a blind signature scheme by Brands [19] . The drawback of blind signatures, however, is that when using the signature later on in a higher-level protocol it must typically be revealed so that a third party can be convinced messages grows. We view our contribution as threefold:
First, in §2, we formally define URS. We present property-based security definitions for unlinkability and unforgeability and also a UC functionality for URS. We show that what distinguishes the strength of our property-based and functionality-based definitions is careful key management. Namely, the latter requires a key registration process that allows for the extraction of signing keys. We validate our definitions by showing that an URS scheme satisfying strengthened property-based security definitions with key extraction securely implements our UC functionality.
Second, in §3, we construct an efficient URS scheme from vector commitments [55, 59, 38] , structure-preserving signatures [3, 4] , and (a minimal dose of) non-interactive proofs of knowledge (NIPoK), which in practice can be instantiated by witness-indistinguishable (!) Groth-Sahai proofs [50] . As we are interested in practical efficiency, we deliberately instantiate our scheme with concrete building blocks, and rely on stronger assumptions (see §4.3). 1 We show how to make use of algebraic properties in our building blocks to minimize the witness size of the NIPoK. For key management, we employ a novel cryptographic primitive, fully structure preserving signatures [1] . Our main target is Groth-Sahai proofs, but we also discuss extensions for optimizing the efficiency of generalized Schnorr proofs of knowledge in case one is willing to accept random oracles.
Third, in §4, to demonstrate the versatility of our URS scheme as a CL-signature 'replacement', we employ it to design the first efficient universally composable anonymous credential system that supports multiple issuers, pseudonyms, and selective disclosure of attributes.
Anonymous credential systems usually need to support an ecosystem of different features. Therefore, a single ideal functionality providing all the features, such as pseudonyms, selective attribute disclosure, predicates over attributes, revocation, inspection, etc. would be very complex and hard to both create and use in a modular way-not to mention credible security proofs.
Nevertheless, ideal functionalities are very attractive for modeling the complexity of anonymous credential schemes. Indeed an early seminal paper [30] attempted exactly this, but was foiled by drawback (2)-as well as by the immaturity of the UC framework at the time. To overcome this complexity, we present a flexible and modular approach for constructing UC-secure anonymous credentials. Namely, we design a core building block for a single issuer that supports credential issuance and presentation with respect to pseudonyms. We then show how to compose multiple such blocks to construct in a modular way a full-fledged credential system with multiple issuers.
Besides being composable, our system is also arguably one of the first schemes to support efficient non-interactive attribute disclosure with cost independent of the number of attributes issued without having to rely on random oracles. Even in the random oracle model this has been an elusive goal. Therefore, because of the composability and efficient selective disclose, our scheme is very attractive and quickly surpasses schemes based on blind signatures and CLsignatures [20, 32] when the number of attributes grows.
Related work. We compare our signatures and credential schemes with other related work. As there are a multitude of papers on redactable, quotable, and sanitizable signatures [51, 22, 61, 7] , we focus on the most influential definitional work and the most promising approaches in terms of efficiency. Further comparison can be found in §5.
A variety of signature schemes with flexible signing capabilities and strong privacy properties have been proposed [41, 18, 8, 7, 10, 14, 35] . While these works provide a fresh definitional approach, their schemes are very inefficient, especially when redacting a message vector with a large number of attributes. Some schemes built on vector commitments [55, 58] achieve bet-ter efficiency but only consider one-time-show credentials, and while the former is not defined formally, the latter involves interaction.
The first efficient multi-show anonymous credential scheme is [30] . It was extended with efficient attribute disclosure [26] and had real-world exposure [34, 21] . It can, however, only be non-interactive in the random oracle model. Non-interactive credentials in the standard model have been built from P-signatures [12, 13] . An instantiation of our URS scheme, however, is almost twice more efficient than [12] despite the fact that the latter does not support signing multiple messages. Izabachène et al. [54] extends the work of [12] with vector commitments; their scheme is, however, not secure under our definitions. In independent work, Hanser and Slamanig [62] present a credential system with efficient (independent of the number of attributes) attribute disclosure. However, their system is only secure in the generic group model [48] . Furthermore, it uses hash function to encode attributes and thus does not enable efficient protocol design. None of these schemes is (universally) composable.
An important factor that is often neglected is the compatibility of schemes with zero-knowledge proofs to enable efficient protocol design. Because of its compatibility with Groth-Sahai proofs, efficiency and composability, immediate further applications of our URS scheme include efficient e-cash, credential-based key exchange, e-voting, auditing, and others.
Definitions of Unlinkable Redactable Signatures
Redactable signatures are an instance of homomorphic [7] or controlled-malleable signatures [41] . For our credentials application the most useful redaction operation is to selectively white-list or quote a subset of messages and their positions from a message vector of length n ( [7] consider the quoting of sub-sentences). We denote the message space of all valid message vectors as M. We also refer to the redacted message as a quote of the original message. To distinguish the original vector from the quote of all messages we denote the original vector as m = (1, m 1 , . . . , m n ) and a quote as m I = (2, m 1 , . . . , m n ). We represent each valid quoting transformation by a set I ⊆ Note that the message itself already reveals whether it is a quote. Chase et al. [41] call such a scheme tiered and we refer to the vectors m and m I as Tier 1 and Tier 2 vectors respectively. The vector m I can be sparse and can have a much shorter encoding than m.
Property-Based Definitions for Unlinkable Redactable Signatures
One can define the security of redactable signatures by instantiating controlled-malleable signature definitions for simulatability, simulation unforgeability, and simulation context-hiding of Chase et al. [41] with the quoting transformation class T = {I(·)|I ⊆ [1.
.n]} above. We prefer, however, to give our own unforgeability and unlinkability definitions that are more specific and do not rely on simulation and extraction. This makes them simpler and easier to prove, and thus more efficiently realizable. Together with key extractability they are nevertheless sufficient to realize the strong guarantees of our UC functionality.
Definition 1 (Unlinkable Redactable Signatures
). An unlinkable redactable signature scheme URS consists of the following algorithms:
URS.SGen(1 κ ) → SP . SGen takes the security parameter 1 κ as input and outputs the system parameters SP . URS.Kg(SP ) → (pk , sk ). Kg takes the system parameters SP as an input and outputs public verification and private signing keys (pk , sk ). The verification key pk defines the message space M. URS.Sign(sk , m) → σ. Sign takes the signing key sk and a message m ∈ M as input and produces a signature σ. URS.Derive(pk , I, m, σ) → σ I . Derive takes the public key pk , a selection vector I, a message m and a signature σ (both of Tier 1) as input. It produces a Tier 2 signature σ I for m I . URS.Verify(pk , σ, m) → 0/1. Verify takes the verification key pk , a signature σ, and a message m of Tier 1 or Tier 2 as input and checks the signature.
We omit the URS qualifier when it is clear from the context.
Correctness. Informally, correctness requires that for honestly generated keys, both honestly generated and honestly derived signatures must always verify.
Unforgeability. Unforgeability captures the requirement that an attacker, who is given Tier 1 and Tier 2 signatures on messages of his choice, should not be able to produce a signature on a message that is not derivable from the set of signed messages in his possession. More formally:
Definition 2 (Unforgeability). Let H be a stateful handle generator. For a redactable signature scheme URS.{SGen, Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify}, tables Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 , and an adversary A, consider the following game: 
A signature scheme URS satisfies unforgeability if for all such PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that in the above game the probability (over the random choices of Kg, Sign, Derive and A) that Verify(pk , σ * , m * I ) = 1 and ∀ m ∈ Q 3 , m * I = m I , and m * I / ∈ Q 2 is less than ν(κ).
Note that we do not consider a Tier 1 signature itself as a forgery. However, if the adversary manages to produce a valid Tier 1 signature on a message m without calling Sign( m) and either Reveal(h) or Derive(h, I) on all subsets I ⊆ [1..n] for the corresponding handle h, he can use this Tier 1 signature to break unforgeability by deriving a Tier 2 signature from it.
Unlinkability. Informally, unlinkability ensures that an adversarial signer cannot distinguish which of two Tier 1 signatures of his choosing was used to derive a Tier 2 signature. More formally:
Definition 3 (Unlinkability). For the signature scheme URS.{SGen, Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify} and a stateful adversary A, consider the following game:
I , Verify(pk , σ (0) , m (0) ) = 1, and Verify(pk , σ (1) , m (1) ) = 1.
• Step 3. Pick b ← {0, 1} and form σ
The signature scheme URS is unlinkable if for any polynomial time adversary A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that
Note that this definition is very strong, as the adversary can even pick pk .
Ideal Functionality for Unlinkable Redactable Signatures
We now give an alternative characterization of unlinkable redactable signatures using an ideal functionality F URS defined as follows:
The functionality maintains tables K and Q initialized to ∅ and flags kg and keyleak which are initially unset.
• On input (keygen, sid) from S, verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid and that flag kg is unset. If not, then return ⊥. Else, send (initF, sid) to SIM and wait for a message (initF, sid, SP , Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify) from SIM, where Kg, Sign, and Derive are PPT algorithms and Verify is a deterministic algorithm. Then, store SP , Kg, Sign, Derive, and Verify, run (pk , sk ) ← Kg(SP ), set flag kg, store (pk , sk ), and return (verificationKey, sid , pk ) to S.
• On input (checkPK, sid , pk ) from some party P , verify that the flag kg is set. Check whether pk = pk or whether (pk , sk ) for some sk was stored in K. In this case, return (checkedPK, sid , true). Else, if (pk , ⊥) was stored in K return (checkedPK, sid , f alse). Else, send (checkPK, sid , pk ) to SIM, wait for (checkedPK, sid , sk ) from SIM, add (pk , sk ) to K. If sk = ⊥, return (checkedPK, sid , true) to P . Otherwise, return (checkedPK, sid , false) to P .
• On input (leakSK, sid) from S verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid . If not, return ⊥. Else, if flag kg is set, set flag keyleak and return (leakSK, sid , sk ).
• On input (sign, sid , m) from S, verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid and that the flag kg is set.
If not, return ⊥. Else, run σ ← Sign(sk , m) and Verify(pk , σ, m). If Verify is successful, return (signature, sid , m, σ) to S and add m to Q, otherwise return ⊥.
• On input (derive, sid , pk , I, m, σ) from some party P , run Derive(pk , I, m, σ) and if it fails, return ⊥. Otherwise, if the flag kg is set and pk = pk then set sk tmp = sk. If there is an entry (pk , sk ) ∈ K recorded, set sk tmp = sk . If sk tmp was set run σ ← Sign(sk tmp, Zero( m, I)) and return Derive(pk , I, Zero( m, I), σ ). Otherwise, return the output of Derive(pk , I, m, σ).
• On input (verify, sid , pk , σ, mI ) from some party P , compute result ← Verify(pk , σ, mI ). If the flag kg is set, pk = pk , flag keyleak is not set, and m ∈ Q such that mI = I( m), then output (verified, sid , mI , 0). Otherwise, output (verified, sid , mI , result).
We point out some aspects of the ideal functionality. The functionality needs to output concrete values as signatures of messages and redacted signatures, as well as key material. To generate and verify these values, F URS requires the adversary/simulator SIM to provide it with a number of polynomial-time algorithms. This is in line with how ideal functionalities for signatures, and in particular blind signatures, have been defined before [6, 36, 46, 53, 57] . We consider static corruptions of protocol machines, but allow the simulator to request the signing key at any time by sending the leakSK message. This allows us to ensure that the privacy properties for users are still enforced even if the signer leaks its secret key. The functional and security properties are enforced by the functionality no matter how these (adversarial) algorithms compute the values. Unforgeability is enforced by the fact that F URS will output false (0) for verification queries for which the message (or a corresponding original message) has not been signed, provided that the signer is not corrupted and the signing key not leaked. (If the signer is corrupted statically, (keygen, sid) will not be sent and hence kg not set and unforgeability not enforced.) Unlinkability of redacted signature is enforced by F URS as follows. It generates a fresh redacted signature only from those parts of the original message that are quoted, i.e., the hidden message parts are set to zero, and thus redacted signatures from F URS do not contain any information about the hidden parts of messages. More precisely, this is enforced for the keys generated by F URS , as well as for any keys that an honest party successfully checked before generating a redacted signature. Unless mentioned otherwise, the reply of the functionality upon a failed check or verification is ⊥. Finally, we define Zero( m, I) = (1,m 1 , . . . ,m n ), withm j = m j for j ∈ I and m j = 0 for j / ∈ I. This should not be confused with the operator I that outputs a Tier 2 message with ⊥ elements on certain positions.
Key Registration and UC Realizability
We now want to construct a protocol R URS that realizes F URS using a URS scheme in the F CRShybrid model where SP is the reference string and each call to F URS is essentially replaced by running one of the algorithms of URS. While this can be done (the detailed description of R URS is given in §A), there are a number of hurdles that need to be overcome. These hurdles are quite typical and include, e.g., that we need to be able to extract the secret keys from the adversary to be able to simulate properly. They are, however, often treated only informally in security proofs. Here we want to make them explicit and treat them formally correct. So our goal is to prove a statement (Theorem) of the form:
If URS is correct, unforgeable, unlinkable, and X then R URS securely realizes F URS in the F CRS -hybrid model.
What do we have to require from X to make this theorem true? To prove the theorem we have to show indistinguishability between the ideal world and the real world. In the ideal world, an environment Z interacts with the simulator SIM and functionality F URS . In the real world, the environment Z interacts with the real adversary A and the protocol R URS .
We provide a tentative description of SIM in the ideal world: when receiving the (initF, sid ) message from F URS , it generates a trapdoor td (in addition to SP ) and returns (initF, sid , SP , Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify). On receiving the (checkPK, sid , pk ) message, is uses the trapdoor to extract the secret key sk and returns sk to F URS .
To make this work, we extend URS with several algorithms: CheckPK is run by R URS on receiving a message (checkPK, sid , pk ). SGenT and ExtractKey are the trapdoored parameter generation and key extraction algorithm for SIM. CheckKeys is used to define what it means to extract a valid key. URS.CheckPK(pk ) → 0/1. CheckPK is a deterministic algorithm that takes a public key pk as an input and checks that it is correctly formed. It outputs 1 if pk is correct, and 0 otherwise. URS.SGenT(1 κ ) → (SP , td). SGenT is a system parameters generation algorithm that takes the security parameter 1 κ as input and outputs the system parameters SP and a trapdoor td for the key extraction algorithm. URS.ExtractKey(pk , td) → sk . ExtractKey is an algorithm that takes a public key pk and a trapdoor td as input. It extracts the corresponding secret key sk . URS.CheckKeys(pk , sk ) → 0/1. CheckKeys is an algorithm that takes a public pk and a private sk keys and checks if they constitute a valid signing key pair. It outputs 1 if they do, and 0 otherwise.
Strengthened Correctness requires that honestly generated keys, but also keys for which predicate CheckKeys(pk , sk ) holds can be used to create signatures that will verify. It moreover guarantees that CheckPK(pk ) holds for honest public keys. 
Definition 4 (Correctness
The additional CheckKeys algorithm is correct if for any message m ∈ M and I ⊆ [1, n] and all pk ∈ {0, 1} * , sk ∈ {0, 1} * there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that Pr[σ ← Sign(sk , m); σ I ← Derive(pk , I, m, σ) : CheckKeys(pk , sk ) = 1 ∧ (Verify(pk , σ, m) = 0 ∨ Verify(pk , σ I , m I ) = 0)] < ν(κ).
Parameter Indistinguishability. Informally, parameter indistinguishability ensures that the SP produced by SGenT and SGen are computationally indistinguishable. It is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Parameter Indistinguishability). A redactable signature scheme URS.{SGen, Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify} with alternative parameter generation SGenT is parameter indistinguishable if for any polynomial time adversary A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that
Key Extractability. Informally, the key extractability ensures that if SGenT was run and if CheckPK outputs 1, then the extraction algorithm ExtractKey(pk , td) will output a valid secret key sk , i.e. CheckKeys(pk , sk ) = 1. 
Definition 6 (Key Extractability
Composable Unlinkability holds even when parameters in the unlinkability game are generated using (SP , td) ← SGenT(1 k ) and A is handed td. This allows for the use of the game in a hybrid argument when proving the security of the simulator. We note that in such an adapted unlinkability game the trapdoor td must only enable key-extraction, and crucially does not allow the adversary to extract a Tier 1 signature from a Tier 2 signature (this would break unlinkability). In our instantiation this is achieved by splitting SP into several parts. The trapdoor is only generated for the part used for key extraction.
UC realization. We prove that if an unlinkable redactable signature URS is correct, parameter indistinguishable, key extractable, unforgeable, and unlinkable, then R URS securely realizes F URS . More formally, we have the following theorem (which is proven in §A). 
The Construction of Our Redactable Signature Scheme
As a first step toward our full solution, we will construct an unforgeable and unlinkable URS scheme without key extraction. The scheme should be of independent interest, in case universal composability is not a design requirement. This isolation of key extraction, seemingly only needed for universal composition, is a nice feature of our definitions. Let G be a bilinear group generator that takes as an input security parameter 1 κ and outputs the descriptions of multiplicative groups grp = (p, G,G, G t , e, G,G) where G,G, and G t are groups of prime order p, e is an efficient, non-degenerating bilinear map e : G ×G → G t , and G andG are generators of the groups G andG, respectively.
Our construction makes use of a structure preserving signature (SPS) scheme SPS.{Kg, Sign, Verify} and a vector commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open,Check}. We recall that the structure-preserving property of the signature scheme requires that verification keys, messages, and signatures are group elements and the verification predicate is a conjunction of pairing product equations. The intuition behind our construction is susceptible simple: Use SPS.Kg to generate a signing key pair and VC.Setup to add commitment parameters to the public key. To sign a vector m, first, commit to m and then sign the resulting commitment C. To derive a quote for a subset I of the messages, simply open the commitment to the messages in m I . We verify a signature on a quote by verifying both the structure-preserving signature (SPS.Verify) and checking the opening of the commitment (VC.Check).
Such a scheme has, however, several shortcomings. First, it is linkable, as the same commitment is reused across multiple quotes of the same message. Even if both the underlying SPS scheme and the commitment scheme are individually re-randomizable, this seems hard to avoid as the unforgeability of the SPS scheme prevents randomization of the message. Second, such a construction is only heuristically secure. Existing vector commitments do not guarantee that multiple openings cannot be combined and mauled into an opening for a different sub-vector. We call vector commitment schemes that prevent this opening non-malleable. (Recently, [62] constructed an SPS scheme allowing for randomization within an equivalence class. However, their commitments cannot be opened to arbitrary vectors of Z p and are not provably opening non-malleable.)
Our main design goal is to address both of these weaknesses while avoiding a large performance overhead. Our main tool for this is an efficient non-interactive proof-of-knowledge. Intuitively, we hide the commitments and their openings, as well as a small part of the signature to achieve unlinkability. Hiding the commitment opening also helps solve the malleability problems for commitments. To achieve real-world efficiency we show how to exploit the re-randomizability of the SPS (and optionally the commitment scheme as described in §C.2).
Before describing our redactable signature scheme in more detail, we present a vector commitment scheme that uses a variant of polynomial commitments from [55] . While our changes are partly cosmetic, they simplify the assumption needed for opening non-malleability.
Vector Commitments Simplified
A vector of messages m ∈ Z n p is committed using a polynomial f (x) that has a value f (i) = m i at the position i. In Lagrange form such a polynomial is a linear combination
To batch-open a vector commitment for a position set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, one uses a polynomial f I (x) = i∈I m i f i (x). For such a polynomial, it holds that f I (i) = m i for i ∈ I; and f I (0) = 0. (The additional root at 0 is necessary to achieve opening non-malleability). The reuse of the same Lagrange basis polynomials, which yields polynomials of not the lowest possible degree, reduces the number of variable bases in the equation of Check below and increases efficiency when used for the construction of bigger protocols such as anonymous credential.) Also, note that f (x) − f I (x) is divisible by the polynomial p I (x) = x · i∈I (x − i). We use the polynomial p(x) = x · n i=1 (x − i) which is divisible by p I (x) for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} to randomize commitments to make them perfectly hiding.
Construction. We reuse the notation of §2 and use Tier 1 vectors m for the vectors being committed and Tier 2 vectors m I for batch openings at positions I. We also let grp = (p, G,G, G t , e, G,G) be bilinear map parameters generated by a bilinear group generator G(1 κ ). VC.Setup(grp). Pick α ← Z p and compute (G 1 ,G 1 , . . . , G n+1 ,G n+1 ) , where
for any polynomial φ(x) of maximum degree n + 1 (and similarly forG φ(α) ). Furthermore, for the above defined f i (x), p(x), and p I (x), we implicitly define
. These group elements can be computed from the parameters pp.
and compute the witness W = G w(α) using parameters pp.
Note that p I (x) always has the factor x. This is essential for achieving opening non-malleability. If p I (x) would be 1 for I = ∅, as in the original polynomial commitment scheme of [55] , then C would be a valid batch opening witness for the empty set of messages.
Security analysis. We require the commitment scheme to be complete, batch binding, and opening non-malleable. Completeness is standard for a commitment scheme follows easily from the following equation:
Next, we define the batch binding and opening non-malleability properties:
Definition 7 (Batch binding). For a vector commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check} and an adversary A consider the following game:
Then, the commitment scheme satisfies batch binding if for all such PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the choices of G, Setup, and A) that 1 = VC.Check(pp, C, m I , W ) = VC.Check(pp, C, m I , W ) and that there exist i ∈ I ∩ I such that m i = m i is at most ν(κ). (Note that m I and m I are Tier 2 vectors, and thus encode the sets I and I respectively.)
Definition 8 (Opening non-malleability). For a vector commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check} and an adversary A consider the following game:
Step 3. Pick random r, compute C ← VC.Commit(pp, m, r), and W ← VC.Open(pp, I, m, r).
Then the commitment scheme satisfies opening non-malleability if for all such PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the choices of G, Setup, Commit, and A that 1 = VC.Check(pp, C, m I , W ), and I = I is at most ν(κ).
In the following theorems we make use of the n-BSDH assumption [49] and the J-RootDH assumption which is defined next. See §F for its generic group model proof. (We note that this assumption is only required for opening non-malleability, which is ignored by most existing constructions of anonymous credentials from vector commitments.)
.n] and J = J, is at most a negligible function ν(κ).
Theorem 2. The commitment scheme VCdefined above is batch binding under the (n + 1)-BSDH assumption. The proof is similar to that of [55] and is found in §B.3.
Theorem 3. The commitment scheme VC defined above is opening non-malleable under the JRootDH assumption. The proofs can be found in §B.3.
Randomizable vector commitments. In §B.4 we consider an algorithm VC.Rand(pp, C, W, I, ρ) for randomizing commitments and openings. It randomizes the commitment as C = C · P ρ I and the witness as W = W · G ρ . These elements then look random, conditioned on them satisfying the Check equations for a particular message m I . We show that the relaxed versions of the above properties that we call randomized batch binding and randomized opening non-malleability hold under the (n + 1)-BSDH and J-RootDH assumptions respectively.
Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge and Witness Indistinguishable Proof Systems
Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation. For pairs (W, Stmt) ∈ R we call Stmt the statement and W the witness. Let L be the language consisting of statements in R. A noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof-of-knowledge system for a language L consists of the following algorithms and protocols: Π.Setup(grp) → CRS . On input grp ← (1 κ ), it outputs common parameters (a common reference string) CRS for the proof system. Π.Prove(CRS , W, Stmt) → π. On input a statement Stmt and a witness W , it generates a zeroknowledge proof π that the witness satisfies the statement. Π.Verify(CRS , π, Stmt) → 0/1. On input Stmt and π, it outputs 1 if π is valid, and 0 otherwise.
We explain the notation for the statements Stmt. We call extractable (non-extractable) witnesses that can (cannot) be extracted from the corresponding proof, respectively. To express the "extractability" property of the witnesses we use notation introduced by Camenisch et al. [29] . For the extractable witnesses we use the "knowledge" notation ( K ), and for the non-extractable witnesses we use "existence" ( E ) notation. We define K as a set of extractable witnesses and E as a set of non-extractable witnesses that we can only prove existence about. We only consider proofs for multi-exponentiations (for existence) and pairing products (for existence and knowledge) equations:
For simplicity of presentation, we do not explicitly specify public values of a statement as additional input to the algorithms, since they are clear from the description of the statement and the list of witnesses.
We employ different proof systems that are either witness indistinguishable or zero-knowledge in terms of privacy, and either extractable or simulation-extractable in term of soundness. For the security proofs we introduce the following algorithms: Π.ExtSetup(grp) → (CRS , td ext ). On input grp, it outputs a common reference string CRS and a trapdoor td ext for extraction of valid witnesses from valid proofs. This is for witnessindistinguishable extractable proofs. Π.SimSetup(grp) → (CRS sim , td ext , td sim ) It outputs a CRS and the extraction and simulation trapdoors. This is for simulation-extraction. Π.SimProve(CRS sim ; td sim ; Stmt) → π. On input CRS sim and a trapdoor td sim , it outputs a simulated proof π such that Π.Verify(CRS sim ; π; Stmt) = 1. Π.Extract(CRS ; td ext ; π; Stmt) → W. On input a proof π and a trapdoor td ext , it extracts a witness W that satisfies the statement Stmt of the proof π. For simulation-extractable NIZK proofs (that are non-malleable) we also allow an additional public input to the Prove and Verify algorithms Π.
which is non-malleably attached to the proof (i.e. the signature of knowledge is computed on this message).
Our Redactable Signature Scheme
We construct our redactable signature scheme URS from a structure-preserving signature scheme SPS, a vector commitment scheme VC, and an extractable and witness-indistinguishable noninteractive proof-of-knowledge system Π described in the previous section. Some SPS and vector commitment schemes might also support randomization; we already discussed such a property for vector commitments in the last sub-section; for signatures we refer the reader to [3, 4] . We denote the randomization algorithms of commitments and signatures by VC.Rand and SPS.Rand, respectively. We denote the randomizable elements of a SPS signature Σ by ψ rnd (Σ) and the other elements by ψ wit (Σ). (For a non-randomizable SPS signature ψ wit (Σ) = Σ.)
Construction. We first give a simplified construction that does not utilize the randomization algorithm of the vector commitment scheme and, therefore, is slightly less efficient.
URS.Kg(SP ).
Obtain grp from SP , generate (pk sps , sk sps ) ← SPS.Kg(grp), output pk = (pk sps , SP ) and sk = (sk sps , pk ). URS.Sign(sk , m). Pick r ← Z p , compute C = VC.Commit(pp, m, r) and Σ ← SPS.Sign( sk sps , C), and return σ = (Σ, C, r). URS.Derive(pk , I, m, σ). First, compute W = VC.Open(pp, I, m, r). Then, if a SPS.Rand algorithm is present, randomize the signature as Σ ← SPS.Rand(pk sps , Σ); otherwise, set Σ ← Σ. And compute the proof π ← Π.Prove(CRS ; C, W, ψ wit (Σ ); K C, W, ψ wit (Σ ) :
Theorem 4. URS is an unforgeable redactable signature scheme, if the SPS scheme is unforgeable, the vector commitment scheme satisfies the batch binding and opening non-malleability property, and the proof-of-knowledge system is extractable and witness indistinguishable. The proofs of Theorems 4 is in §C.1.
Theorem 5.
URS is an unlinkable redactable signature scheme if the proof-of-knowledge system is witness indistinguishable. The proofs is given in §C.1.
Alternative construction. If the vector commitment scheme has a randomization algorithm, we can use a slightly more efficient scheme as described in §C.2.
Strengthened scheme for an universally composable construction. To be able to satisfy the UC functionality, we require an additional key-extraction property. We thus build an augmented redactable signature scheme URS from a redactable signature scheme URS * (without key extraction) and a zero-knowledge non-interactive proof-of-knowledge system Π * .
* , π sk ) and sk = (sk * , pk ). We note that URS * .Kg(SP * ; r) denotes a key generation algorithm with fixed randomness r. URS.CheckPK(SP , pk ).
Check that Π * .Verify(CRS sk ; π sk ; K sk E r : (pk , sk ) = URS * .Kg(SP * ; r)) = 1.
Sign, Derive, Verify are almost unchanged and use pk * internally. SGenT and ExtractKey use the extraction setup and extractor of the proof system respectively, while CheckKeys checks that the relation R holds for pk and sk .
Note that Groth-Sahai proofs can be used to implement key-extraction by proving a binary, or n-ary decomposition of the secret key [60] . But this comes at a huge cost of more than 61,000 group elements at 128-bit security, even if this cost is only incurred once by every user per public key. We propose instead to use fully structure-preserving signatures (FSPS) [1] such that sk consists of group elements and can be easily extracted. FSPS for signing single group elements can be as cheap as 15 elements per signature and proofs of key possession consist of just 18 elements.
Theorem 6. The strengthened scheme URS is an unforgeable, unlinkable, and key extractable redactable signature scheme, if the underlying redactable signature scheme URS * is unforgeable and unlinkable, and the proof-of-knowledge system Π * is zero-knowledge and extractable.
Unforgeability and unlinkability are simple corollaries of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5. Keyextractability follows directly from the extractability of the proof system.
Signing group elements as additional parts of the message. While the presented redactable signature scheme can sign and quote a large number of values in Z p very efficiently, in certain applications, like the one presented in the next section, one might also need to sign a small number of additional group elements. In the Derive algorithm these elements will either be part of the derived message, and given in the clear after derivation, or be treated as part of the witness, i.e., hidden from the verifier. The detailed construction and the security proofs are given in §D.
From Unlinkable Redactable Signatures to Anonymous Credentials
As we designed our UC-secure URS scheme as a building block for privacy-preserving protocols, anonymous credentials are a natural application. Indeed, an (unlinkable) redactable signature scheme is already a simple selective-disclosure credential system where the attributes issued to users are the messages signed in Tier 1 signatures and a user can later reveal a subset of her attributes by deriving a Tier 2 signature. However, in an anonymous credential system, users also require secret keys and pseudonyms (pseudonymous public keys), on which credentials can be issued and with respect to which credentials can be presented. This allows users to prove that they possess several credentials issued from different parties on the same secret key [20, 32] . In this section, we extend the functionality of URS in two ways: (1) we bind Tier 1 signatures to user secret keys in a way that prevents the derivation of signatures without knowledge of the secret and (2) we bind Tier 2 derived signatures to the unique context, cxt (nonce), to prevent replay attacks in which an attacker shows the same signature derived twice.
We first recall the algorithms of a multi-issuer anonymous credential system and then provide an instantiation using URS. To be modular and to simplify the analysis, we then provide an ideal functionality for a single issuer. The functionality is carefully designed to self-compose naturally into a full-fledged credential system with multiple issuers. Finally, we provide a concrete instantiation of our generic construction and analyze its efficiency.
Algorithms of Our Anonymous Credential System
Let us first introduce the parties and the algorithms of a multi-issuer anonymous credential system supporting user attributes (cf. [20, 32] ). Its protagonists are users (U), issuers (I), and verifiers (V). Each user has a secret key X , from which she can derive (cryptographic) pseudonyms P . To get a credential issued, a user sends to the issuer a pseudonym P together with a (non-interactive) proof π X ,P that she is privy to the underlying secret key. The issuer will then issue her a credential Cred on P containing the attributes a the issuer vouches for. The user can then present the credential to a verifier under a potentially different pseudonym P by sending, together with P , a (non-interactive) proof π X ,Cred that she possesses a credential on the attributes a I . Recall that I defines which attributes shall be revealed.
A credential system Cred defines a set of algorithms: a system parameters generation algorithm SGen; an issuer setup algorithm Kg; a user secret generation algorithm SecGen; algorithms for pseudonym generation and verification NymGen and NymVerify, respectively; an algorithm to request a credential RequestCred; an algorithm for issuing a credential IssueCred; an algorithm to check a newly issued credential for correctness CheckCred; an algorithm to show a credential with respect to a pseudonym (to create a credential proof) Prove; and an algorithm to verify a credential proof Verify.
Definition 10. A credential system Cred is a set of the following basic algorithms:
Cred.SGen(1 κ ) → SP is a system setup algorithm that generates the common system-wide parameters SP . Cred.Kg(SP ) → (pk , sk ) is an issuer setup algorithm, with which the issuer generates a key pair for issuing credentials and publishes the public key pk . Cred.SecGen(SP ) → X is a secret generating algorithm that takes the common parameters as an input and outputs a fresh user secret X . Cred.NymGen(SP , X ) → (P , aux (P )) is a pseudonym generating algorithm that takes system parameters, a user secret as an input and creates a pseudonym P and some auxiliary information aux (P ) for P . Cred.NymVerify(SP , P , X , aux (P )) → 1/0 verifies that the pseudonym was generated correctly w.r.t. to the user's secret key. Cred.RequestCred(SP , pk , X , P , aux (P )) → (π X ,P , aux (Cred )) takes the common parameters SP , the public key of the issuer pk , the secret X , and a pseudonym P together with the corresponding auxiliary information aux (P ), and produces a request for issuing a credential (a proof of knowledge of the user secret) π X ,P and some optional auxiliary information aux (Cred ) for the requested credential. Cred.IssueCred(SP , sk , P , a, π X ,P ) → Cred /⊥ takes the common parameters SP , a request for issuing a credential received from the user π X ,P , the issuer key pair, and the vector of attributes a assigned to the user as an input, and, if the issuance token verifies, produces a credential, otherwise it outputs ⊥. Cred.CheckCred(SP , pk , X , P , aux (P ), Cred , aux (Cred ), a) → 0/1 verifies if a credential received from the issuer is valid. Cred.Prove(SP , pk , X , P , aux (P ), Cred , aux (Cred ), a, I, cxt) → π X ,Cred is an algorithm executed by the user, that takes the user secret X , a credential Cred , a pseudonym P , and a context cxt as an input and outputs a (presentation) proof π X ,Cred that reveals only a required subset I of the attributes a from the credential. Cred.Verify(SP , pk , P , a I , π X ,Cred , cxt) → 1/0 is an algorithm executed by the verifier, that verifies a presentation proof provided by the user.
We instantiate these algorithms by adding support for user secrets, pseudonyms and contexts to our redactable signature scheme. Besides the URS algorithms, we use pseudonym generation and verification algorithms based on a structure preserving commitment scheme SPC and a gap problem to generate credential specific secrets. A gap problem has a generator K Gap that generates (X Cred , Y Cred ) and a verification algorithm V Gap , such that it is easy to verify (X Cred , Y Cred ) but hard to compute X Cred from Y Cred . This hardness is used to prevent the mauling of the simulation-extractable presentation proofs. Table 1 gives the construction of our credential scheme. We group the core credential algorithms into those used for setup, issuing and presentation. In our security definition and the proof we will make use of additional algorithms for simulation and extraction.
Ideal Functionality for Credentials
Rather than defining a credential system with a number of different issuers, we chose to first give a protocol for a single issuer only, to reduce complexity. Later, we show how to build a full-fledged credential system with multiple issuers by combining multiple instances of the protocol, one for each issuer. To this end, we support sharing pseudonyms across instances. Moreover, users should be able to use different pseudonyms for the issuance of a credential and for each proof of a credential. Thus, the functionality is parameterized by a pseudonym generation and verification scheme (SecGen, NymGen, NymVerify) which in our realization will be a commitment scheme. For compositionality we do not model unlinkability, but that presentation proofs leak nothing except their pseudonyms and the revealed attributes (modeled using simulation). We therefore, somewhat counter intuitively, do not immediately rely on pseudonyms being hiding. The hiding property, however, matters for the whole credential system. Indeed, without pseudonyms being hiding, users can be linked when they interact with the issuer or prove possession of a credential w.r.t. a pseudonym, both in the real and the ideal world.
We start with specifying an ideal functionality F Cred that describes the security properties with respect to a single issuer and for pseudonyms that are controlled by the environment. We then describe a protocol R Cred for a single issuer based on F CA and F CRS . Finally, we show that R Cred indeed securely realizes F Cred in the (F CA , F CRS )-hybrid model under static corruptions. 2 As the efficient integration of pseudonyms requires zero-knowledge and thus whitebox techniques, R Cred does not use R URS as a (blackbox) subroutine. We will, however, carefully align the internals of F Cred and R Cred with those of F URS and R URS respectively, such that we can use the UC emulation theorem in one of the hybrid steps of our security proof. 
Setup algorithms
Cred.NymVerify(SP , X , P , aux (P )) : Parse aux (P ) as O. Output the result of SPC.Check(pp SPC , P , O).
Issuing algorithms
Cred.RequestCred(SP , pk , X , P , aux (P )) :
1. Verify the request for issuance π X ,P : If Π.Verify(CRS X ; π X ,P ; Stmt P ) = 0, return ⊥. 2. Else, generate a credential by creating a Tier 1 signature on the vector of messages, providing the pseudonym and a gap problem challenge, and calling σ ← URS.Sign(sk , (P , Y Cred , a)) and output Cred = σ. Cred.CheckCred(SP , pk , X , P , aux (P ), Cred , aux (Cred ), a) : Output the result of URS.Verify(pk , Cred , (P , Y Cred , a)).
Presentation algorithms
Compute a proof of knowledge of the secret, pseudonym, and the correctness of the signature on a context:
Add σ I to π X ,Cred as a part of the public input. Cred.Verify(SP , pk , P , π X ,Cred , a I , cxt) : Output the result of Π.Verify(CRS X ; π X ,Cred ; Stmt(SP , P , σ I , a I ), cxt).
Simulation and extraction algorithms
Take (X, aux (P )) from Π.Extract(SP ; td ext ; π X ,Cred ; Stmt)). Cred.SimProve(SP , sk , td sim , P , a I , cxt) → π X ,Cred :
1. X ← SecGen(SP ); (P , aux (P )) ← NymGen(SP , X ).
2. Let a 0 be a Tier 1 message restored from a I by replacing ⊥-s with 0-s as if it was derived from the original message a by applying Zero( a, I).
Compute a proof of knowledge of the secret, pseudonym, and the correctness of the signature on a context: π X ,Cred ← Π.SimProve(CRS X ; td sim ; P ; Stmt, cxt). Single issuer ideal functionality. The starting point for our credential functionality is the ideal functionality of unlinkable redactable signatures, extended in a number of ways. Similar to F URS (and in line with other UC-functionalities such as F sig that need to output cryptographic values), F Cred is handed a number of cryptographic algorithms by the simulator, so that F Cred can produce artifacts for proofs of credential ownership and attribute disclosure, and to verify such proofs. Indeed, the functionality cannot ask the simulator for such artifact's as sometimes done, but needs to run these algorithm itself to guarantee privacy (cf. F URS and the UC-functionalities for blind signatures [6, 46] ).
For this to work, the functionality needs to assure verifiers that all pseudonyms are related to some legitimate user. Consequently, our simulator uses a special parameter generation algorithm that also outputs extraction and simulation trapdoors: Cred.SGenT(1 κ ) → (SP , td ext , td sim ). The extraction trapdoor is an input to the user secret extraction algorithm Cred.Extract(SP , td ext , pk , P , π X ,Cred , a I , cxt) → X, aux (P ). This algorithm is used to ensure that a proof of possession is accepted only if correct X and aux (P ) (such that NymVerify accepts) are extracted. Similarly, the functionality needs to give assurance to users that nothing except their pseudonyms and their attributes is leaked in a proof of possession. We model this using a simulation algorithm Cred.SimProve(SP , sk , td sim , P , a I , cxt) → π X ,Cred that the simulator provides to the functionality. This corresponds to the simulator providing the Sign algorithm in F URS .
We now describe the ideal functionality and highlight the security properties it ensures. F Cred maintains some bookkeeping information (tables): M ISS -for storing information about issued credentials, and M PRES -for storing information about credentials that produced presentation proofs.
First, upon receiving the (keygen, sid ) message, F Cred performs a setup by asking the simulator for the system parameters, keys, trapdoors, algorithms and a list of corrupted parties. It generates all cryptographic artifacts using the algorithms provided. Message (leakSK, sid ) is handled in exactly the same way as for redactable signatures. Message (checkPK, . . .) used in F URS is no longer needed, as we assume that in the real world all issuer keys are automatically checked upon registration with F CA .
Second, upon receiving the (issueCred, sid , qid , U, X , P , aux (P )) message from a user, F Cred initiates credential issuing. It will, however, only proceed if the issuer specified in sid = (I, sid ) is willing to issue some attributes a to the user, and if X , P , and aux (P ) form a valid pseudonym.
Third, upon receiving a proof request in the form of a (proveCred, . . .) message, instead of creating a proof using the user secret and other credential information used during the issuance request, the functionality uses the Cred.SimProve algorithm that only takes the pseudonym, with respect to which the presentation is done, and disclosed attributes as an input, but no private or linkable information, i.e. non-disclosed attributes are already "redacted" . This guarantees that after seeing a presentation token, the issuer cannot tell to which credential the token is related (absent weaknesses in the pseudonym algorithms as discussed above).
Finally, upon receiving the (verifyCredProof, . . .) message, F Cred -besides verifying the proof itself-uses the Cred.Extract algorithm and bookkeeping information to make checks that guarantee that: (1) the adversary should not be able to produce a presentation proof that verifies and that reveals attributes that were never issued to the user secret of the pseudonym; (2) for honest users that keep their user secret private the adversary should not be able to repeat a proof with a fresh context that was not seen before. Here, we consider an honest user's secret private as long as no dishonest user received a credential for the same secret.
We describe the ideal functionality F Cred for credentials in Figure 1 . Note that because we consider static corruption, we assume that F Cred and SIM are aware of corrupted parties. Namely, whether I is corrupted or not and which users U are honest and which are corrupted.
Functionality F Cred (SecGen, NymGen, NymVerify)
The functionality maintains tables MISS and MPRES initialized to ∅ and flags kg and keyleak which are initially unset.
• On input (keygen, sid) from I, verify that sid = (I, sid ) for some sid and that flag kg is unset. If not, then return ⊥. Else, do the following: 1. Send (initF, sid) to SIM and wait for a message (initF, sid , SP , sk , pk , tdsim, tdext, SimProve, Verify, Extract) from SIM, where SP are the system parameters, tdsim and tdext are the simulation and extraction trapdoors respectively, and the rest are polynomial-time algorithms. Store all of these values and set flag kg. 2. Return (verificationKey, sid , pk ) to I.
• On input (leakSK, sid) from I verify that sid = (I, sid ) for some sid . If not, return ⊥. Else, if flag kg is set, set flag keyleak and return (leakSK, sid , sk ).
• On input (issueCred, sid , qid , X , P , aux (P )) from U, check sid = (I, sid ) for some sid , and that flag kg is set. If not, return ⊥. Else send a public delayed output (issueCred, sid , qid , P ) to I.
• On input (issueCred, sid , qid , a) from I, check for (issueCred, sid , qid , X , P , aux (P )) from U, and verify that sid = (I, sid ) for some sid and that the flag kg is set. If not, return ⊥. Else, do the following:
We consider a protocol R URS that realizes F URS using the algorithms in §4.1 in the (F CRS , F CA )-hybrid model where SP is the reference string and each call to F Cred is essentially replaced by running one of the algorithms of Cred. The detailed description of R Cred is given below in §E.1.
Theorem 7.
Let URS be the unlinkable redactable signature scheme according to Definition 1, SPC is a structure-preserving commitment scheme, Gap be a gap problem, Π be a noninteractive proof of knowledge system. Then R Cred securely realizes F Cred in the (F CRS , F CA )-hybrid model if URS is correct, unlinkable, unforgeable, and key extractable, SPC is binding, the non-interactive proof-of-knowledge system is zero-knowledge and simulation extractable, and the Gap problem is hard. The proof is provided in §E.2.
Building a full-fledged credential system with multiple issuers. We now explain how to use our credential functionality to support multiple issuers using multiple sessions of F Cred , one for each issuer, and a pseudonym functionality that supports creation of user secrets and generation and verification of pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are required to be both hiding and binding to hide a user secret and prevent users from sharing credentials without also sharing their secret. Users now can generate a user secret and different pseudonyms on it and then use multiple calls to F Cred instances for different issuers to get credentials (from different issuers but bound to the same secret). To compose a presentation proof that reveals attributes from different credentials, the user creates a pseudonym P and uses the corresponding F Cred instances to generate the required proofs with respect to this pseudonym. Since the pseudonym is the same in different proofs and each proof guarantees the same underlying secret in the credential and the pseudonym, pulling these proofs together results in a single proof for multiple credentials. Each proof block guarantees unlinkability and unforgeability, and since the pseudonym is both binding and hiding this composed proof is also unforgeable and unlinkable with respect to the other composed proofs. The verification is done by querying the corresponding F Cred instances for verification of each particular proof part.
Instantiation and Efficiency Analysis
To analyze the efficiency of our scheme we consider a concrete instantiation scenario. We instantiate our non-interactive construction with Groth-Sahai proofs [50] , the structure-preserving commitment scheme of [5] , and our unlinkable redactable signature scheme presented in §3.3. As a gap problem we pick the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The URS scheme is instantiate with the fully structure-preserving signature scheme by Abe et al. [1] , Groth-Sahai proofs, and the vector commitment scheme from §3.1. The proof of Theorem 8 follows from Theorems 6-7.
Theorem 8. The credential system described above securely realizes F Cred defined in §4.2 if the SXDH, J-RootDH, n-BSDH, q-SDH, XDLIN, co-CDH, and DBP assumptions hold. Consult building blocks for definitions of assumptions.
We refer to §5 for the comparison with prior work. We stress that the complexity of the Prove and Verify algorithms is independent of the number of all attributes contained in a credential.
The size of the credential proof is roughly 130 group elements (100 when using the SPS of [3] instead of FSPS). This means that the communication efficiency for showing a credential with respect to a pseudonym is around 8 KB (6 KB for SPS) at 128-bit security level, which is close to Idemix credentials [32] as the size of pairing groups is much smaller than the size of RSA groups and because the size of Idemix credential proofs is linear in the number of attributes. Besides, Idemix credentials do not provide such strong formal security guarantees, i.e. they require random oracles for non-interactive proofs and are not universally composable. Our non-UC scheme is more efficient than the credential system of Izabachène et al. [54] that has credential proofs of around 8 KB, while our UC scheme has comparable proof sizes. Our scheme is much less efficient than the scheme of [62] but their scheme relies on hash functions in their construction and thus does not enable efficient protocol design.
Open questions. We leave the construction of a scheme that achieves the same functionality as ours with the efficiency of [62] -perhaps using fully structure preserving signatures of equivalence classes-as an interesting open problem. Other interesting questions are exploiting the lack of opening non-malleability for attacks on existing constructions and efficiently basing the opening non-malleability property of vector commitments on a more standard cryptographic assumption than the J-RootDH assumption of Definition 9.
Detailed Comparison with Related Work
In this section we compare our URS and Cred schemes with related work and highlight the advantages of our scheme. A variety of signature schemes with flexible signing capabilities and strong privacy properties have been proposed [41, 18, 10, 14] . Such schemes generalize existing privacy-preserving schemes such as group signatures, and anonymous credentials. Our work on URS is most closely related to the work of Chase et al. [41] . They define simulatable malleable signatures and show how to instantiate (a base scheme without attributes for) delegatable credentials. Ahn et al. [7] and Attrapadung et al. [8] consider redactable signatures but for a different redact operation that allows to quote substrings. While these works provide a fresh definitional approach (indeed our definitions of unlinkability and unforgeability are inspired by [41] ), they do not aim at being directly applicable in the real world and are rather inefficient, especially when redacting a message vector with a large number of attributes. Canard and Lescuyer [35] proposed an anonymous credential system built from sanitizable signatures-a special case of malleable signatures. Apart from being less efficient than ours, their scheme is only proven secure in the random oracle model.
Our starting point for achieving practical efficiency is vector commitments [40, 59, 38] , a cryptographic building block introduced by Catalano, Fiore and Messina [40] . Kate et al. [55] mention one-time-show credentials as one of the applications of their polynomial commitments scheme. Without providing any construction and security proofs, the authors suggest to build credentials by committing to the attributes, which the issuer then certifies by signing the resulting commitment. Recently, Kohlweiss and Rial [58] built a private access control protocol with efficient selective attribute disclosure from vector commitments. Their solution, however, is still one-time-show and requires re-issuing and thus interaction. Instead, we construct a multi-show credential system and put their intuition on a formal basis.
The first efficient multi-show anonymous credential scheme is [30] . Its success led to implementations [34] and related protocols are even contained in standards [21] . Many cryptographic papers on anonymous credentials often focus on a base protocol, with pseudonyms, but without attributes. A notable exception is [26] , which studies an extension to the identity mixer system for efficient attribute disclosure. Their result is in the random oracle model, however. The first non-interactive anonymous credential scheme that does not rely on random oracles is [12] . Psignatures, the primitive underlying their construction is a signature scheme falling short of being structure-preserving and is engineered towards the anonymous credentials application. Both Psignatures, and also the work on delegatable credentials [47] consider a base protocol without attributes. Belenkiy et al. [13] define multi-block P -signatures with a proof size linear in the number of messages.
In Table 2 we compare the communication efficiency of our schemes with P-signatures [12, 13] . Our scheme is more efficient and provides UC-security only at the cost of the public key being larger by a constant factor. UC PK size Tier 1 Signature Tier 2 signature/Proof Extending the work of [12] in combination with vector commitments, Izabachène et al. [54] construct block-wise P -signatures and use them to built efficient anonymous credentials (see §4.3 for an efficiency comparison with our credential scheme). Although their techniques are superficially similar to ours, we list some crucial differences:
Their credential scheme targets a restricted class of predicates, individual attribute release and dot-products, however, it is less efficient than the instantiation of our scheme from §4.3, and requires more communication rounds. Instead, we advocate the use of general-purpose NIZK to prove arbitrary predicates as natural extensions to our core scheme. Moreover, they do not provide replay-attack countermeasures for presentation proofs. A reuse of another user's proof is not considered a forgery. Indeed, their definitions do not guarantee that credentials are nonmalleable, implying that multiple credential proofs of true predicates may be combinable into a proof of an yet unproven, but true, predicate. This is crucial for a non-interactive credential scheme and is taken care of in this work.
Independently, Hanser and Slamanig [62] presented a credential system with efficient (independent of the number of attributes) attribute disclosure. Their scheme had security weaknesses that were subsequently fixed. However, it still does not capture opening non-malleability, and is only proven in the generic group model.
Contrary to a lot of existing work, we aim for modularity both in our constructions and proofs by formalizing the security properties of all building blocks, including vector commitments, from which we build our URS and our anonymous credential scheme. Thus, all the building blocks and UC-functionalities we define can be used for the modular design of other protocols (e-cash, group signatures, e-voting, etc.).
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A Proof of Theorem 1
First, we show how the ideal functionality is implemented with the real algorithms of URS from Definition 1.
We define protocol R URS as follows:
Realization R URS :
• On input (keygen, sid) from S, verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid and that flag kg is unset. If not, then ignore the request. Else, ask F CRS for SP , run (pk , sk ) ← Kg(SP ), set flag kg, store (pk , sk ) and return (verificationKey, sid , pk ) to S.
• On input (checkPK, sid , pk ) from some party P , compute b = CheckPK(pk ) and return (checkedPK, sid , b) to P .
• On input (leakSK, sid) from S verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid . If not, ignore the request. Else, if flag kg is set, set flag corrupt and return (leakSK, sid , sk ).
• On input (sign, sid , m) from S, verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid and that flag kg is set. If not, ignore the request. Else, return the output of Sign(sk , m) to S.
• On input (derive, sid , pk , I, m, σ) from some party P return the output of Derive(pk , I, m, σ).
• On input (verify, sid , pk , σ, m I ) from some party P , return the result of Verify(pk , σ, I, m I ). Proof. We prove the theorem by proving the indistinguishability of the ideal world and the real world. In the ideal world, the environment Z interacts with the simulator SIM and the ideal functionality F URS . In the real world, the environment Z interacts with the real adversary A and the protocol R URS . For any real world adversary we construct an ideal world adversary such that if the environment can distinguish weather it interacts in the real or in the ideal world, one can construct a reduction algorithm that uses Z to break correctness, key extractability, parameter indistinguishability, unforgeability, and unlinkability of the redactable signature scheme. First, we provide a description of the simulator in the ideal world. When receiving (initF, sid ) message from F URS , SIM generates (SP , td) by running SGenT(1 κ ) algorithm, stores td and returns (initF, sid , SP , Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify). On receiving (checkPK, sid , pk ) message, SIM uses the algorithm ExtractKey(pk , td) to extract the secret key sk and returns sk to F URS . If extraction fails, it returns ⊥.
The proof is done through a sequence of games. In Game 0, Z interacts with F URS and SIM as in the ideal world, and, in Game 6, Z interacts with A and R URS as in the real world. In each game we make a step towards the real world and show that if the environment can distinguish between the current and the previous game, then one can build an adversary that breaks a security property of URS. We define the success probability of Z to distinguish between Game i and Game j as |p i − p j |. We show that |p 6 − p 0 | ≤ p corr + p crs−ind + q · p unlink + p unf + p key−extr , where p corr , p crs−ind , p unlink , p unf , and p key−extr are the probabilities of breaking the correctness, parameter indistinguishability, unlinkability, unforgeability, and key extraction properties of the redactable signature scheme, respectively.
Game 0: implements the ideal world, where the environment Z interacts with the simulator SIM and the functionality F URS as described above. Game 0 : is the same as Game 0 except the simulator SIM and the functionality F URS are subsumed in a single entity that we denote C, i.e., C runs SIM and F URS internally and interacts with the environment on behalf of SIM and F URS . The change from Game 0 to Game 0 is purely conceptual and hence |p 0 − p 0 | = 0. Game 1: Here C behaves as in Game 0 except when receiving (derive, sid , pk , I, m, σ), C just returns the output of Derive(pk , I, m, σ), in particular C will never compute a fresh signature σ $ ← Sign(sk tmp , Zero( m, I)) and return Derive(pk , I, Zero( m, I), σ ). Using an hybrid argument, we prove that if Z can distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1 then one can break the unlinkability of URS. We define Hybrid k as follows: Hybrid k: Upon input the i th (derive, sid , pk , I, m, σ) query, the derived signature is computed as follows:
• for all i < k, C returns the output of Derive(pk , I, m, σ) (as in Game 1);
• for i ≥ k, C first runs Derive(pk , I, m, σ) and if it fails, outputs ⊥. Otherwise, if pk = pk then let sk tmp = sk. If there is an entry (pk , sk ) ∈ K recorded, let sk tmp = sk . Then C runs σ I . Thus, summing up over all hybrids, one can see that |p 1 − p 0 | ≤ q · p unlink . Game 2: Here C behaves as in Game 1 except when the environment sends the message (checkPK, sid , pk ), C computes b = CheckPK(pk ) and returns (checkedPK, sid , b). In particular, C does not attempt to extract the secret key from pk . If the environment can distinguish between Games 1 and 2, then we can build an adversary A key−extr that breaks the key extractability of URS. Let E be the event when ExtractKey() algorithm fails to output a valid sk even though CheckPK(pk ) outputs 1. As long as this event does not occur, Z's view in Game 2 and Game 1 is identical. Now, the reduction works as follows. When receiving an (keygen, sid ) message, A key−extr uses SP received from the challenger. On input (checkPK, sid, pk ) A key−extr runs ExtractKey(pk) and, if it fails, outputs pk to the challenger. One can see that when event E happens then A key−extr breaks the key extractability property. Therefore, |p 2 − p 1 | ≤ p key−extr . Game 3: Here C behaves as in Game 2 except when the environment sends the message (keygen, sid ), C computes SP using SGen() algorithm instead of SGenT. If the environment can distinguish between Games 2 and 3, then we can build an algorithm A crs−ind that breaks the parameter indistinguishability of URS. Let b = 0 if it is Game 2 (since in Game 2 SP is generated using SGenT) and b = 1 if it is Game 3 (since in Game 3 SP is generated using SGen). Then A crs−ind just forwards the output of Z to the parameter indistinguishability challenger. Hence |p 3 − p 2 | ≤ p crs−ind .
Game 4:
Here C behaves as in Game 3 except when the environment sends (sign, sid , m), C does not run the verification algorithm before outputting the signature. Let E 1 be the event when Verify(pk , σ, m) algorithm outputs 0 even though σ is output of the signing algorithm run with the corresponding secret key and the message vector. As long as this event does not occur, Z's view in Game 3 and Game 4 is identical. One can see that when event E happens then the correctness property does not hold. Hence we can write that |p 4 − p 3 | ≤ p corr . Game 5: Here C behaves as in Game 4 except when receiving verification request input (verify, sid , pk , σ, m I ), C returns the result of Verify(pk , σ, m I ). Now, we show that if the environment can distinguish between Game 5 and Game 4 then we can construct the adversary A unf that breaks the unforgeability of the redactable signature scheme. The reduction algorithm A unf works as follows:
• On input (keygen, sid) from S, verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid and that flag kg is unset. If not, then ignore the request. Get pk from the unforgeability challenger, set flag kg, store (pk and return (verificationKey, sid , pk ) to S.
• On input (sign, sid , m) from S, verify that sid = (S, sid ) for some sid and that flag kg is set. If not, ignore the request. Else, ask the signing oracle Sign(·) for the signature σ on m and output (signature, sid , m, σ) to S.
• On input (verify, sid , pk , σ, I, m I ) from some party P , compute result ← Verify(pk , σ, I, m I ) and do the following: If result = 1 and m such that m = Zero(m ) and m was not queried before, then output (m, σ) as a forgery to the unforgeability challenger and (verified, sid , m, result) to Z. Otherwise, continue the simulation. Let us analyze the success probability of A unf . Let E denote an event when Z sends a verification request (verify, sid , m I , pk ) on a message that was never signed before (or that cannot be derived from any message m that was signed before: m = I( m) and the signer S is uncorrupted. As long as the event E does not occur, Z's view between Game 4 and Game 5 is the same. Therefore, the probability that event E occurs is greater equal than the probability that Z distinguish between Game 4 and Game 5. Notice, that event E can occur only before the signer S is corrupted (or the secret key gets leaked). This means that whenever event E occurs, A unf outputs a successful forgery. So the probability of the event E is actually the probability of the adversary A unf to win the unforgeability game. Thus, we have that |p 5 − p 4 | ≤ p unf . Game 6: is the realization of the real world where C is replaced with real A and π URS . One can see that Game 5 is the same as Game 6, since already in Game 5 C runs A and R URS internally and interacts with the environment on behalf of A and R URS . So the change from Game 5 to Game 6 is purely conceptual and hence |p 6 − p 5 | = 0.
By summing up over all games, the probability that the environment can distinguish between interacting with the ideal functionality F URS and SIM and with the real protocol R URS and A is |p 6 − p 0 | ≤ p corr + p crs−ind + q · p unlink + p unf + p key−extr . Com.Check(pp, C, m, O) is a verification function that takes parameters, the commitment, the message and the opening as input, and outputs 1 or 0 representing acceptance or rejection, respectively.
B Vector Commitments and
We note that in some cases the opening can be an input to the Commit algorithm. We say that a commitment scheme Com is secure if it satisfies the following definitions of perfect hiding and computational binding.
Definition 12 (Perfect Hiding
). A commitment scheme Com is perfectly hiding if for any adversary A and security parameter κ the following holds:Pr[pp $ ← Com.Setup(1 κ ); (m 0 , m 1 , state) ← A(pp); b $ ← {0, 1}; (C, O) $ ← Com.Commit(pp, m (b) ); A(state, C) → b : b = b ] = 1 2 .
Definition 13 (Computational Binding).
A commitment scheme Com is computationally binding if for any PPT adversary A and security parameter κ there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that
We also provide the definition of a Structure-Preserving Commitment Scheme from Abe et al. [5] .
Definition 14 (Strictly Structure-Preserving Commitment Scheme [5]). A commitment scheme
Com is strictly structure-preserving SPC with respect to a bilinear group generator G if
• SPC.Setup outputs pp that consist of the group description grp = (p, G,G, G t , e, G,G) and group elements in G andG; • the message space M SPC consists of group elements in G andG; • SPC.Commit outputs the commitment and the opening that consist of group elements in G andG;and • SPC.Check checks only membership in G andG and pairing product equations over grp.
The authors of [5] call such scheme "strictly" structure-preserving, since parameters, messages, commitments, and openings are allowed to consist only of the group elements from G andG (and the group description for parameters). Some works, however, for example [3] , relax this definition and also allow the target group elements (from G t ) in the output spaces of the algorithms.
B.2 Vector Commitments
Vector commitments (VC) [39, 59] allow to commit to a vector of values in such a way that it is possible to open the commitment only w.r.t. specific positions.
Definition 15 (Vector Commitment Scheme). A Vector Commitment scheme is a non-interactive primitive that consists of the following algorithms:
VC.Setup(1 κ , ) $ → pp. Given the security parameter 1 κ and the size of the committed vector (with = poly(κ)), the key generation outputs some public parameters pp, which implicitly define the message space M.
VC.Commit(pp, m, r)
$ → C. On input a sequence (vector) of messages m = (m 1 , . . . , m ), randomeness r and the public parameters pp, the committing algorithm outputs a commitment string C. VC.Open(pp, i, m, r) $ → W . This algorithm is run by the committer to produce a witness W that m is the i th committed message. the auxiliary information aux can include the update information produced by these updates. VC.Check(pp, C, x, i, W ) → 0/1. The verification algorithm accepts (i.e., it outputs 1) only if W is a valid witness that C was created to a vector m 1 , . . . m such that x = m i .
B.3 Proofs of the Theorems from §3.1
Theorem 2. The commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check} defined in §3.1 is batch binding under the n-BSDH assumption.
The proof of the theorem is analogous to that of [55] and could be omitted. Nevertheless, we give a proof of the theorem as a simple corollary of Theorem 9 presented in the next section.
Theorem 3. The commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check} defined in §3.1 is opening non-malleable under the J-RootDH assumption.
Proof. The implicit quantification over all J ⊆ [1, n] gives us some flexibility as to which instance to attack. Alternatively, one can interpret this assumption as an interactive assumption in which the adversary is allowed a one-time query for J.
We follow the steps of the game to build a reduction: 1. We create pp as usual using the G,G,
that form part of every assumption instance and provide it to A. 2. When A outputs ( m, I) we will attack a J-RootDH instance with J = [1, n] \ I.
We compute
· Y . The reduction hands C and W to A. 4. When A returns I , W we know from the verification equations that e(C,G) = e(W ,P I )e(F m I ,G)
Thus the reduction can break the J-RootDH assumption below by outputing [1, n] \ I ,
B.4 Re-randomizable Vector Commitments
We consider the vector commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check} from §3.1 together with a randomization algorithm: VC.Rand(pp, C, W, I, ρ)
Compute the re-randomized commitment C = C · P ρ I
and the witness W = W · G ρ , and return a couple (C , W ).
We revisit our batch-binding and opening non-malleability definitions in the presence of such randomization algorithm.
Definition 16 (Randomizable batch binding). For a vector commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check, Rand} and an adversary A consider the following game:
• Step 1. grp ← G(1 k ) and pp ← Setup(grp)
• Step 2. C, I, m, W, ∆, C , I , m , W , ∆ ← A(pp) Then the commitment scheme satisfies randomizable batch binding if for all such PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the choices of grp, Setup, and A) that Rand(C, W, I, − log G ∆) = Rand(C , W , I , − log G ∆ ), 1 = Check(pp, C, I, m, W ) = Check(pp, C , I , m, W ), and that there exist i = i j = i j such that m i = m i is at most ν(k).
Note that this definition corresponds to the standard batch binding if ∆ and ∆ are fixed to 1.
Definition 17 (Randomizable opening non-malleability). For a vector commitment commitment scheme VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check, Rand} and an adversary A consider the following game:
• Step 2. m, I ← A(pp)
• Step 3. Pick random r, compute C ← Commit(pp, m), r), and W ← Open(pp, ı, m, r).
• Step 4. C , W , i , ∆ ← A(C, W ) Then the commitment scheme satisfies opening non-malleability if for all such PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the probability (over the choices of grp, Setup, Commit, and A) that Rand(C, W, I , − log G ∆ ) = (C , W ), 1 = Check(pp, C , I , m ı , W ), and I = i is at most ν(k).
Theorem 9. The vector commitment scheme VC is randomizable batch binding under the BSDH assumption.
Proof. From the randomization and verification equations we know that e(C,G)e(∆,P ı ) = e(W,P ı )e(F ı ,G)e(∆,P ı ) = = e(W ,P ı )e(F ı ,G)e(∆ ,P ı ) = = e(C ,G)e(∆ ,P ı ).
If A is successful, there exists i = i j = i j such that m i j = m i j
The polynomials f i , f i , p i , p i can be factored as follows using polynomials φ, φ , π, π :
We denote w = log G W , w = log G W , and ρ = logG ∆, and rewrite the above equations expressed using exponents
Now moving back to computing over group elements and using pairings to do multiplication, we get that
Which contradicts the BSDH assumption.
Theorem 10. The batch openings of VC.{Setup, Commit, Open, Check, Rand} are non-malleable under the J-RootDH assumption.
Game 1: is the same as the previous game except that Derive computes a fresh commitment and signature, i.e., r ← Z p , C ← VC.Commit(pp, m, r), W ← VC.Open(pp, I, m, r), Σ ← SPS.Sign(sk sps , C), and compute π ← Π.Prove(CRS ; (C, W, ψ wit (Σ)); K C, W, ψ wit (Σ) : SPS.Verify pk sps , Σ, C) ∧ VC.Check(pp, C, I, m I , W ) to return (ψ rnd (Σ), π). This change is perfectly indistinguishable because of the witness indistinguishability of the proof system and the perfect randomization of the ψ rnd (Σ), hence |p 1 − p 0 | ≤ p nip−wi . Game 2: proceeds like Game 1, but the proof-of-knowledge system parameters are switched to extraction parameters and using the extraction trapdoor, the SPS signature σ * and the commitment C * of the forgery are extracted; |p 2 − p 1 | ≤ p nip−ext . Game 3: simulates the view of adversary in the same way as Game 2; except that if (σ * , C * ) are not a signature/message pair produced by any of the signing oracles, the forgery is rejected.
The success probability of the adversary decreases at most by the success probability of breaking unforgeability for the SPS scheme, i.e. |p 3 − p 2 | ≤ p sps−unf . Game 4: is the same as Game 3, except for rejecting any forgery which contains C, I * , m * such that the Sign or Derive query corresponding to C was made for a message m, but m * = I * ( m).
The success probability of the adversary decreases at most by the success probability of breaking the binding property of the commitment scheme (since the adversary would have to open a commitment to a different value). Thus, |p 3 − p 2 | ≤ p com−bind . Game 5: proceeds like Game 4, but any forgery for which the extracted commitment C corresponds to a Derive query with a set I, but I * = I; The success probability of the adversary decreases at most by the success probability of breaking the non-malleability property of the vector commitment scheme. (Since the output of Derive contains only (hiding) ZK proofs of the witness, but not the witness itself, onetime non-malleability is sufficient for here.) Thus, |p 5 − p 4 | ≤ p com−nmal . Note that as both I * and I * ( m) = m are bound to queried values, the success probability of A in Game 5 is 0. Overall, the adversary's probability of winning Game 0 is p qbsig−unf ≤ p nip−wi + p nip−ext + p sps−unf + p com−bind + p com−nmal .
Theorem 5. URS.{SGen, Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify} is an unlinkable redactable signature scheme if the proof-of-knowledge system is witness indistinguishable.
Proof. We define two experiment E 0 and E 1 which correspond to the experiment in the unlinkability game defintion (cf. Definition 3) with, respectively, b = 0 and b = 1 chosen in the step 3.
E 0 and E 1 are indistinguishable due to the perfect witness indistinguishability of the proof system and the perfect randomization of the ψ rnd (Σ ). Hence, p qbsig−unlk = p nip−wi .
C.2 Alternative Construction
This construction utilizes the VC.Rand algorithm of the vector commitment scheme. Theorem 11. URS = (SGen, Kg, Sign, Derive, Verify) of the alternative construction is an unforgeable and unlinkable redactable signature scheme, if the SPS scheme is unforgeable, the vector commitment scheme satisfies the batch binding and opening non-malleability property, and the proof-of-knowledge system is witness indistinguishable.
The proof of the theorem follows similarly to the proofs of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 using the randomizable properties of the commitment described in §B.4. We defer the proof to the full version of the paper.
SPS.Rand(pk sps , Σ). Parse σ as (Z, R, S,T , U, V,W ) and return (Z, R , S ,T , U , V ,W ), where
for randomly chosen ρ, τ, µ, ϕ ← Z p . The scheme is existentially unforgeable under the Strong Flexible-Pairing assumption [3] . Its signatures Σ are of size 7, and Rand algorithm yields ψ rnd (Σ) = (R,T , U,W ) and ψ wit (Σ) = (Z, S, V ). Therefore, when doing a GS proof of knowledge of a signature and a message, one can give 4 of the signature elements in the clear as part of the proof after a re-randomization, commit to 3 + n group elements, and produce proof elements for two one-sided equations; this yields a proof of size 3 + 2 * (3 + n) + 2 * 2 = 13 + 2n.
We also note that one could use a different SPS scheme with smaller signature size. However, it yields more efficient redactable signatures only under stronger assumptions which are not noninteractive q-type. Hence, we prefer to use the above SPS scheme for our main instantiation. Structure Preserving Signatures [4] SPS.Kg(grp). Select α, β, γ, γ 1 , . . . , γ n ← Z * p and compute
.
p and return Σ = (R,R, S, T ), where
, and T =G τ .
SPS.Verify(pk sps , Σ, (M 1 , . . . , M n )). Parse Σ = (R,R, S, T ) and accept if the following equations hold:
The scheme is strongly existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack under a "q-type" non-interactive assumption. A Groth-Sahai NIWI proof of knowledge of a signature and a message for this scheme will consist of 18 + 2n group elements as one needs to commit to 4 + n group elements, each commitment consists of two group elements, and produce proof elements for one pairing-product equation and one one-sided pairing product equation, which require 8 and 2 group elements, respectively.
Note that the previous presented scheme [3] has larger signature size than the [4] scheme, when combined with GS proofs for proving knowledge of a signature and a message, the former yields slightly more efficient proofs. However, if one is willing to tolerate stronger assumptions, a more efficient variant of the latter scheme presented in the same paper can be used. Its verification equations are:
where (R, S, T ) is the signature. Moreover, the scheme supports full re-randomization of the R element of the signature. Hence, the cost of a NIWI proof of knowledge for that scheme is 9 + 2n if R is given in the clear as part of the proof after a re-randomization as one has to commit to 2+n group elements and produce the proof elements for two one-sided pairing product equations.
D Extending URS to Sign Additional Group Elements
In this section we extend our redactable signature scheme to sign additional group elements besides the commitment. Namely, we extend Sign to take as additional input a vector M of group elements. For that we use a SPS signature that supports signing multiple messages. In the Derive algorithm these elements will either be part of the derived message, and given in the clear after derivation, or be treated as part of the witness, i.e., hidden from the verifier. To do so, we extend our input vector of exponents by appending a vector of group elements to it ( M , m) = (M 1 , . . . , M N , m N +1 , . . . , m N +| m| ) . A set I applied to this extended vector ( M , m) I , will now indicate not only which exponents, but also which group elements are revealed.
Construction. We denote the extended algorithms as URS = (SGen, Kg, Sign, Verify, Derive). We define the extended signature, derivation, and verification algorithms as follows.
URS.Kg(SP ).
Obtain grp from SP , generate (pk sps , sk sps ) ← SPS.Kg(grp), output pk = (pk sps , SP ) and sk = (sk sps , pk ). URS.Sign(sk , ( M , m) ). Pick r ← Z p , compute C = VC.Commit(pp VC , m, r) and Σ ← SPS.Sign( sk sps , (C, M )), and return σ = (Σ, C, r). URS.Derive(pk , ( M , m), I, σ). First, compute W = VC.Open(pp VC , I, m, r). Then, if an SPS.Rand algorithm is present, randomize the signature as Σ ← SPS.Rand(pk sps , Σ); otherwise, set Σ ← Σ.
Compute the proof π ← Π.Prove CRS ; (C, W, ψ wit (Σ )); S), where
SPS.Verify(pk sps , Σ , (C, M )) = VC.Check(pp VC , C, I, m I , W ) = 1.
Output (σ I = ψ rnd (Σ ), π). URS.Verify(pk , σ, ( M , m)). Check that Π.Verify CRS ; π; S) = 1.
Theorem 13. The extended signature scheme URS.{SGen, Kg, Sign, Verify, Derive} is an unforgeable, unlinkable, and key extractable redactable signature scheme, if the underlying SPS scheme is unforgeable and randomizable, the vector commitment scheme is batch-binding and opening non-malleable, and the proof system is zero-knowledge and extractable.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proofs of Theorems 4-5 and is omitted here.
E Details on Anonymous Credentials E.1 Full Single Issuer Protocol.
Before proceeding to the details of the realization, let us also describe the functionality F CA , which is a slightly modified version of the one provided by Canetti in [36] . More precisely, our F CA functionality additionally checks the correctness of the key. In the realization, this can be done by executing an interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key between the issuer and the certification authority. As shown by Camenisch et al. [29] , such interactive proofs are efficient and still online extractable (a crucial property for the UC model). When implementing such scheme, the ideal functionalities F CA and F Cred will be replaced by their secure implementations. as follows. The user secret is an exponent. A credential is a Tier 1 signature on a vector of attributes, where the user secret is the fixed first attribute. During the presentation the user derives a Tier 2 signature on the required set of messages (except the secret, of course) and also provides a ZK proof about her secret key.
This construction is more efficient than the non-interactive one because of the efficiency of sigma-protocols, but it requires more rounds of communication and does not provide straight-line extractability, i.e., the extraction protocols require rewinding.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 6. Let URS be the unlinkable redactable signature scheme according to Definition 1, SPC is a structure-preserving commitment scheme, Gap be a gap problem, Π be a noninteractive proof of knowledge system. Then R Cred securely realizes F Cred in the (F CRS , F CA )-hybrid model if URS is correct, unlinkable, unforgeable, and key extractable, SPC is binding, the non-interactive proof-of-knowledge system is zero-knowledge and simulation extractable, and the Gap problem is hard.
Proof. First, we provide a description of the simulator in the ideal world. SIM generates (SP , td, td sim , td ext ) by running the Cred.SGenT(1 κ ) algorithm, stores these values and simulates F CRS and F CA .
If the issuer is honest, when receiving (initF, sid ) message from F Cred , SIM generates issuer keys honestly and returns (initF, sid , SP , sk , pk , td sim , td ext , Cred.SimProve, Cred.Verify, Cred.Extract) where it uses URS algorithms inside. It also simulates issuer key registration with
If the user is also honest, only the network is controlled by the adversary, so the simulator generates a simulated transcript for the issuance as follows. On seeing the delayed output signal for (issueCred, sid , qid , P ), simulate an honest user credential request. SIM records which X Cred , Y Cred it used in the simulation. If the user's message is delivered (in the real world), let the message through to I. Simulate the honest issuer response. On seeing the delayed output signal for (credIssued, sid , qid , a) finish the simulation of the issuing protocol, and if the protocol runs to completion, let the messages through to U.
If the user is corrupted, the issuance simulation is done as follows. When seeing on the network the adversary's issuance request to the issuer, SIM extracts the secret X , aux (P ) from the proof π X ,P . If the extraction fails pick any invalid X and aux (P ). Send message (issueCred, sid , qid , X , P , aux (P )) to F Cred on behalf of a dishonest user and short-circuit the delay. Upon receiving (credIssued, sid , qid , a) as a dishonest user from F Cred , SIM computes a credential using the URS.Sign algorithm and sends the signature to the real dishonest user. Note that F Cred does not send the (credIssued, . . . ) message if extraction failed because of the NymVerify check.
Upon a verification request, Cred.Extract obtains the witness (X , P , aux (P ), aux (P ) , X Cred , Y Cred ) from the proof π X ,Cred for bookkeeping using the extraction trapdoors and aborts, if the extraction fails.
If the issuer is corrupted, on message (registeredIssuerKey, sid , pk ) with sid = (I, sid ), SIM runs ExtractKey(pk , td) to extract the secret key sk . If extraction fails, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, SIM sends (initF, sid ) to F Cred on behalf of I and replies with (initF, sid , SP , sk , pk , td sim , td ext , Cred.SimProve, Cred.Verify, Cred.Extract) to F Cred .
If the user is honest, upon receiving the message (issueCred, sid , qid , P ) from F Cred , simulate an honest user credential request with the real adversary controlling the issuer. SIM records which X Cred , Y Cred it used in the simulation. Wait for the reply from the real dishonest issuer.
If the credential is successfully received, then send (issueCred, sid , qid , a) to F Cred and again short-circuit delays.
The case when the user is also corrupted is handled internally by the adversary and the simulator does not need to do anything.
We will make steps towards using the ideal functionality of URS. We start with viewing SIM as using the simulator SIM URS internally as a blackbox. Then SIM generates (SP , td, td sim , td ext ) by sending (initF, sid ) to SIM URS to learn (initF, sid , SP URS , URS.Kg, URS.Sign, URS.Derive, URS.Verify) and generating the remaining values as prescribed by algorithm Cred.SGenT(1 κ ). Similarly, it extracts keys by sending (checkPK, sid, pk ) to SIM URS to receive the secret key sk in return.
One can also see Cred.SimProve as running F URS and a copy of SIM URS with its current state internally. Namely, Cred.SimProve generates fresh X, P , computes a valid signature σ, and obtains σ I by first sending (checkPK, sid , pk URS ) and then (derive, sid , pk URS , I, a, σ) to
The proof is done through a sequence of games. In Game 0, Z interacts with F Cred and SIM as in the ideal world. In Game 15, Z interacts with R Cred (and A, though we will use dummy adversaries) as in the real world. In each game we make a step toward the real world and show that if the environment can distinguish between the current and the previous game, then one can build an adversary that breaks one of the security properties of URS, Π, or solves the gap problem Gap.
We define the success probability of Z to distinguish between Game i and Game j as |p i − p j |. We show that |p 15 − p 0 | ≤ p urs−corr + 2p spc−bind + 2p urs−unf + p urs−unl + p urs−kext + p nizk −zk +p nizk −se +p gap , where p urs−corr , p urs−unf , p urs−unl , and p urs−kext are the probabilities of breaking the correctness, unforgeability, unlinkability, and the key extractability of the URS scheme respectively, p nizk −zk and p nizk −se is the probability of breaking zero-knowledge and simulation extractability of the NIZK scheme respectively, p spc−bind is the probability of breaking the binding property of the commitment scheme, and p gap is the probability of solving a gap problem. Game 0: implements the ideal world, where the environment Z interacts with F Cred and SIM as described above. Game 1: is the same as Game 0 except the simulator SIM and the functionality F Cred are subsumed in a single entity that we denote C, i.e., C runs SIM and F Cred internally and interacts with the environment on behalf of SIM and F Cred . It also maintains the lists M ISS and M PRES initialized to ∅ and flags kg and keyleak that are initially unset. The change from Game 0 to Game 1 is purely conceptual and hence |p 1 − p 0 | = 0. Game 2: Here C behaves as in Game 1 except that we now conceptually split C into the parts that simulate F CRS and F CA , and the rest. We split the rest into SIM Cred that uses SIM URS and F Cred that uses algorithms, like SimProve that can be seen as using F URS . We remove the redundant copy of SIM URS and connect parts directly. State changes to the state of the SIM Cred copy of SIM URS did not affect the SimProve copy and vice versa: the SIM Cred copy was only used for extraction, which is stateless, and the SimProve copy only required that (checkPK, sid, pk URS ) was sent at least once before deriving signatures. The change from Game 1 to Game 2 are thus purely conceptual and hence |p 2 − p 1 | = 0. Game 3: Modify F Cred to pass messages (keygen, sid ) and (leakSK, sid ) through to F URS , which in turn interacts with SIM URS . SIM URS observes the key pk URS returned as part of the (verificationKey, sid , pk URS ) message and embeds this key into the issuer public key pk . This is merely a preparation for later steps to install the right key with the correct keyleak flag in Note that in (verifyCredProof, sid , . . . ) we only have to extract if there is no record (PRES , U, cxt , X * , P , aux (P ) , a I , π X ,Cred ), that is for proofs that are not simulated. The advantage of the adversary in Game 12 is bounded by the simulation extractability of the noninteractive proof system, therefore |p 11 − p 10 | ≤ p nizk −se . Game 13: is the same as Game 12, except that calls to the realization R URS are replaced with calls to URS + algorithms. Due to the fact that R URS is realized in such a way that on any incoming message the real algorithm are invoked, this change is purely conceptual, |p 13 − p 12 | = 0. Note that we always run concrete algorithms with their inputs readily available. Game 14: is the same as Game 13, except that we generate proofs using Prove instead of SimProve.
The advantage of the adversary in Game 14 is bounded by the zero-knowledge property of the non-interactive proof system, therefore |p 14 − p 13 | ≤ p nizk −zk . Game 15: is the realization of the real world where C is replaced by A, F CRS , F CA , and R Cred .
One can see that Game 15 is the same as Game 14, since already in Game 14 C runs A, F CRS , F CA , and R Cred internally and interacts with the environment on behalf of A and R Cred . So the change from Game 15 to Game 14 is purely conceptual and hence |p 15 − p 14 | = 0.
Summing up the probabilities, we have that |p 15 −p 0 | ≤ p urs−corr +2p spc−bind +2p urs−unf + p urs−unl + p urs−kext + p nizk −zk + p nizk −se + p gap .
F Generic Group Proof of J-RootDH Assumption
Definition 18 (J-RootDH Assumption). Let J be a subset of [1. .n], let α, r ∈ Z * p , and X = (G α· n i=1 (α−i) ) r , Y = (G i∈J (α−i) ) r . For all PPT algorithms A, the probability P r[A(G,G,
, X, Y ) = J , Z] such that Z = (G i∈J (α−i) ) r and J ⊆ [1.
We show that the assumption holds in the generic group model. In the generic group model, elements of the bilinear groups G,G, and G t are encoded as unique random strings. Thus, the adversary cannot directly test any property other than equality. Oracles are assumed to perform operations between group elements, such as performing the group operations in G,G, and G t . The opaque encoding of the elements of G is defined as the function ξ 1 : Z p → {0, 1} * , which maps all a ∈ Z p to the string representation ξ 1 (a) of G a ∈ G. Similarly, we have ξ 2 : Z p → {0, 1} * forG and ξ T : Z p → {0, 1} * for G t . The adversary A communicates with the oracles using the ξ-representations of the group elements only. Theorem 14. Let A be an algorithm that solves the J-RootDH assumption in the generic group model. Let n G be the number of queries A makes to the oracles computing the group action and pairing. If ξ 1 , ξ 2 , and ξ T are chosen at random, then the probability that A(p, ξ 1 (1), ξ 2 (1), ξ 1 (α i ), ξ 2 (α i ), i = 1, . . . n + 1, ξ 1 (α · n i=1 (α − i)r), ξ 1 ( i∈J (α − i)r)) outputs ξ 1 ( i∈J (α − i)r) for some J = J, is bounded by ≤ (n G + 2n + 6) 2 n p .
Proof. Consider an algorithm B that interacts with A in the following game. Let Initially, τ = 0, τ 1 = n + 4, τ 2 = n + 2, τ T = 0 and the polynomials are: F 1,0 = 1; F 1,i = α i , i = 1, . . . n + 1; F 1,n+2 = α · n i=1 (α − i)r; F 1,n+3 = i∈J (α − i)r. F 2,0 = 1; F 2,i = α i , i = 1, . . . n + 1. B begins the game with A by providing it with the random strings ξ 1,0 , . . . ξ 1,n+3 , ξ 2,0 , . . . ξ 2,n+1 . We describe the oracles A may query:
Group action: A inputs two group elements ξ 1,i and ξ 1,j , where 0 ≤ i, j < τ 1 , and a request to multiply/divide. B sets F 1,τ 1 ← F 1,i ± F 1,j . If F 1,τ 1 = F 1,u for some u ∈ {0, . . . , τ 1 − 1}, then B sets ξ 1,τ 1 = ξ 1,u ; otherwise, it sets ξ 1,τ 1 to a random string in {0, 1} * \{ξ 1,0 , . . . , ξ 1,τ 1 −1 } .  Finally, B returns ξ 1,τ 1 to A, adds (F 1,τ 1 , ξ 1,τ 1 ) to L 1 , and increments τ 1 . Group actions for G and G t are handled the same way.
Pairing: A inputs two group elements ξ 1,i and ξ 2,j , where 0 ≤ i < τ 1 , 0 ≤ j < τ 2 . B sets F T,τ T ← F 1,i · F 2,j . If F T,τ T = F T,u for some u ∈ {0, . . . , τ T − 1}, then B sets ξ T,τ T = ξ T,u ; otherwise, it sets ξ T,τ T to a random string in {0, 1} * \{ξ T,0 , . . . , ξ T,τ T −1 }. Finally, B returns ξ T,τ T to A, adds (F T,τ T , ξ T,τ T ) to L T , and increments τ T .
We assume SXDH holds in (G,G, G t ) and therefore no isomorphism oracles exist. Eventually, A stops and outputs an element ξ 1,e , where 0 ≤ e ≤ τ 1 .
We argue that it is impossible for A's output to always be correct. The output polynomial must be a linear combination of the polynomials corresponding to the elements available to A in the respective group. Consider the output polynomial F 1,e : (α − i)r + e 1,n+3
We denote as J the set that is complimentary to J . The conditions for the adversary's forgery being successful is
Substituting F 1,e , F 1,0 , and F 1,n+2 in equation (1) by their polynomials we have
(α − i)r + e 1,n+3
which can be further expanded and simplified to
(α − i)r = 0 .
Since polynomials e 0 · α i∈J (α − i) and e 1,i · α i+1 i∈J (α − i) do not contain variable r, and polynomial e 1,n+2 · α 2 · n i=1 (α − i)r i∈J (α − i) has a degree that is different from the one of α · n i=1 (α − i)r, equation (2) can always hold only in case of e 0 = e 1,i = e 1,n+2 = 0. But since F 1,e = 0 and e 0 = e 1,i = e 1,n+2 = 0 we have that e 1,n+3 = 0 and
(α − i)r = 0, J = J .
We now discuss when equation (3) always holds. We only need to consider the case when the degrees of the polynomials are equal (i.e. when |J| = |J |, since in this case |J| + |J | = n). e 1,n+3 =
